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APPROACH TO A GENERAL THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

APPROACH TO A GENERAL THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

PARTE II

APPROACH TO A GENERAL THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Fernando dos Reis Condesso, Full Professor of the Lisbon University

Abstract: In general, the economics is multifaceted. There are theories. But there is also something beyond. The best program may fail if economic agents do not believe in it and a poor program can lift the economy out of a crisis if the trust agents in its success. But there is not really antinomies. Contrary to the established dogma. Born of different problems. And they are only effective, each at different times. The major theories are not mutually exclusive. The premises, correct or not, and their dynamic logic are located, for diagnostics and therapeutics at different times health. Subject to verifiable definition. And requiring tailored solutions, which they permeate. But that often are applied at the wrong time. As the imposition of political, influenced by them. And that, in the rush to results, which, in times of crisis, do not appear soon, have shown to be prone to consistency and insistence on necessary measures and due time. In any event, apply them on inappropriate moments affect the dynamism of the economic process. If it occurs in a growth cycle, undermine the recovery in Genesis crisis the level of microeconomics, and especially in times of crisis derivative losses of assets, reflected social panics in economic agents and lack of confidence, not only reverse in first, the dangers of depressions and recessions but also harms the recovery and worsen same time its consequences.

Keywords: economy, liberalism, interventionism, diagnostic, therapeutic.

 

I.INTRODUCTION  

The various economic theories have different characteristics when discussing certain aspects and dynamics, resulting from the distinct analysis of empirical experiences.
Given that this is a theory in matter of social nature, it cannot undergo a trial to prove the hypothesis, in its own process of scientific production. It is the normal methodology in the social sciences deductive and inductive with analysis, diachronic and synchronic using all the central bibliography of different schools and the empirical reflection triggered either the last years of crisis either by historical reports and studies on the previous economic crises. We have to start from the hypothesis that, having to resort to the existing reality or to the historic "experience", in a diachronic and synchronic line of analysis one must go beyond the dogmas and would-be infallible mathematized models, to determine the major or minor correction on these theories. Fleeing from its devaluation by the deification of its revenues without measure or temporality. But trying to perceive its application at different times, some of which were successful and others were a disaster. Meaning, denying the absolute value in space and time. Relocating them to only the useful moments, present throughout the history in the various moments of the evolution of economies. We start, therefore, from the unsurpassed rereading of the economic events of the past and from an analysis of other experiences of the moment.Collecting from them the facts, factors and registered consequences, verifiable, effects and influences that help to confirm or disprove theories and models that its followers present, in order to reformulate theses or even rebuild new syntheses, adjusting theories to reality, demystifying unconfirmed universal assumptions or dogmas or even concluding that each time has different dosages of demands and seasonings, or even distinct origins and conceptions, as to the relative application of its recipes.
In fact, in question is the “political economy”. Economy in and for society. Meaning, in itself and in its inextrincable inter-relationship with the social, the collective, and the individual but generalizable psychological. An economy and settled policies and based in and for specific societies, in historically set moments. Economy, itself, but also through politics, whether active, regulatory or permissive, and through the right, organizer, facilitator, promoter but also preventive.  That everyone, acting or omitting, guide and govern the society in which it occurs and seeks to support and advance. In fact, addressing the political economy is dealing with the interconnection between economy, politics and law (Fernando Condesso, 2012, 2013; Rosado Pacheco, 2000). And these, to be effective, must appear embedded in a dual synthesis, less as alternative theses and more as complementary solutions, bearing in mind the different stages of economic life and its specific requirements. Meaning, the normal growth periods and periods of crisis of societies, their economic processes and their public finances, on which they depend of.At issue, it is the divorce of schools in the acceptance of a diversified reality (different realities and different assumptions), that required different solutions. In fact, in question in economic and social processes, there is not a unique reality (pointform, located in an ethereal space sanctified agents without corruptive greed of the economic system and impeccable ethics, ever growing. And not always one is facing a crisis reality. And not always a structural crisis, with gradual loss of strength of the different factors of production; or always panics crisis, face the unexpected, abrupt loss of business assets, lack of trust in political and economic actors, insolvency, maintenance of unproductive savings, consumption decreases). What is at issue, dismissing the idea of unique assumptions, is a reality of the social that is plural and not always predictable. Imposing different analysis, equally acceptable, linked to the evolution of different spaces and times, linked to positive desires or psychologies of fear, wind uprising situations and sudden destruction events, not always able to constructive synthesis (sometimes blistering the gross national product and others asking the question of its recession), if left to itself. This is what is important to diagnose in situated terms, without the stereotyped therapeutic recipes, of a single school, can’t work, but worsen the situation. In question, the "political economy", that must there also be the link between economics, politics and law, a dual synthesis that bears in mind the normal growth periods and the periods of crisis. II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

II.1.The two main macroeconomic theories in confrontation today appear divided on key policy issues (Bordo, 2007; Ciccone and Jarocinski, 2008, Tan, 2008, Eichengreen, 2007): that is, not only in the matter of direct state intervention, on the incentives to the economy and the regulation of this in key aspects of standards, rules, and control (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991:179-190), especially of the financial system, that in times of crisis is only saved if it begins to live of the taxpayers' money (Bernanke, 1983:257-276; Ang, 2008: 536-576). In general, neoclassical, who believe in the continuous rebalancing, automatic of the markets, understand that these only "fail in the face of imperfect information and other frictions" (Bagus, 2011), and should the incentives go through currency issued by the Central Bank.
Neo-Keynesians argue that the state should run a budget deficit financed by issuing bonds channeling this money directly to infrastructure projects, as a condition for economic growth.  Let us see the main differences between the different neo-economists (mainstream economy, neoclassical and neo-Keynesian), which together reduce the spectrum of macroeconomic policies and alter the specific objective of this and of Keynesianism and of the great theorists of the German and Swedish non-liberal schools.
Liberal theories are essentially based on three tenets that although contradicted empirically, do not really remove interest from to economic policy theories. Start by noting the full availability of perfect information and negligibility of the problem of uncertainty in the economy. According to the neo-liberal, economic agents have or can acquire perfect information regarding future events, so that the uncertainty can be framed by calculations of probabilities. Abolish the fundamental distinction between uncertainty of the economy (considering irrelevant the psychology of financial markets, the variability of investment and the role of money as value container), and the risk of economic agents. Then there is the statement of assurance of automaticity of effective adjustments. Neo-classics authors eliminate the time factor, as to external shocks would not have to follow up situations where markets manage crises, since agents with continuously updated information could carry out instant adjustments.  If neo-Keynesians admit short term failures (mainly due to the rigidity of prices in the face of demand shocks), they do not explain the failure of aggregate demand when disregarding the uncertainty factor; and understand that markets, by themselves, can never auto-balance to the level of full employment (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994:143-173), either the short or the long term, as it is not possible to have the necessary information to do so. Finally, they defend the application to macroeconomics of the optimization theory by companies and consumers (microeconomics), removing the resulting ideas of uncertainty for the future and therefore the consideration of the structure of individual behavior by aggregated psychological data (propensity to consume, state of confidence, liquidity preference). Their stereotyped economic models only give emphasis to "real variables" (employment, real wages, etc.) and not the necessary importance to the trust element. However, measures to promote the economy should be taken, in line with the teachings of the non-liberal schools Swedish and German and its present assumptions in the thinking of Keynes. First, with selective and reproductive public investment, bearing in mind the confidence effect linked to positive expectations, the “dismultiplier” (lowering) effect of uncertainty and mistrust ", that stimulates the economy, reduces unemployment and urges to consume more, with an impact and changes positively as a whole the economic proceeding.
Such requires a good time plan and the objectives to be achieved for this purpose. Should this not happen, there may be a multiplier effect of distrust and uncertainty.
It must be therefore immediate, adequate and correct public policy incentives. Even an imposed policy, to the extent that banks receive public assistance, financial aid measures, given the credit crisis. So that the multiplier effect of the money can expand.
This depends on loans at a reasonable cost to businesses and the effective spent of the money.
Which a simple lending of public money or simply creating money does not guarantee.

II.II. Crisis, themselves, if have structural reasons, imply a contraction phase in the economic cycle, but even if originally based on mere loss of assets leaking private credit contraction, if not accompanied imply a significant reduction in economic activity (SHISKIN, 1974: 222).That is considered a normal phase of economic cycles, innate to the capitalist economy.
However, in recent times we live a crisis that appears to be a "lost" opportunity to rethink abstract theories in order to reframe the public policy and norms, including preventive ones. Applying countercyclical theories. Often, with a strong loss in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  With imposition of budget balances, accompanied by confidence in monetary policies (STIGLITZ and GREENWAL, 2004), that are ineffective in short term and harmful in long term, flexibilities that are income decrease, accentuating inequalities (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002: 727–744), and, in general, excessive social austerity. With guided public policies, in large part, by mere public spending cuts and individual incomes, which result in the "promotion" of an over-crisis recessive economy (Costa, Pereira and Cruz, 2011:51-84). Derived from the financial crisis, not corrected in the hotspots by appropriate public policies that avoid serious implications on the country's loss of wealth and people in general. With the consequent difficulty term recovery in the countries concerned. That is, a general downturn in economic activity for a certain period of time.  There is a drop in the level of production (GDP), higher unemployment, a drop in the level of investment, decline in household income, reduced profit rate of enterprises, increase in the number of "bankruptcy" and payment arrangements with partial pardon and dilation over time (HISKIN, 1974:222; ACHUTHAN and BANERJI, 2008; SANDRONI, 1985).

Its origin in general drift of the recession Its origin is usually in the recession, in the overall decline in spending, consumption and public and private investment, and of company loans, due to errors of economic agents, bubbles, panic, private downturn in demand for credit, and consequent uncertainties of the economy.

Only the massive intervention of the US Federal Reserve, and the support of management to companies, which incorporate goods in the domestic market, then avoided the worst; but, in Europe, we had a maintenance or even decline in wages and benefits; to restrictions in countries in crisis; not had an increase in imports by developed countries and surpluses in their trade balances, eg Germany; this also did not occur on a global scale, with Asia, first China; this, however, taking advantage of the free and unregulated market has experienced in international trade with the practice of dumping, first the "political dumping" (or political and labor: the dictatorships have no trade union movements or strikes, or collective bargaining work, nor guarantee times and not enslaving remuneration); and had inappropriate policies imposed in rescue situations, the IMF and the UE; public financial support significant interest and not forward-looking policies to support the development of economy and society, especially with support to credit for businesses of tradable goods, or to the re-industrialization incorporating high added value; but essentially concerned essentially with the payment of debts of the banking system and the surplus countries, and the reconstruction of the State according to an ultra-liberal model without regulatory fixes the causes of banking crisis, which still does not bode well.

 Naturally, the issue of consumption engine becomes more complex in a commercially integrated Europe, no longer cooperative, supportive, but highly competitive and within the current liberal globalization, but aggregate demand will always be decisive.

 However, if the economic theory must start from the demand problematic (and not from the supply, as per the neoclassics), in fact, nowadays, this analysis should be mindful of the fact that the consumption promotion policies can serve a lot to the increase in the trade deficit, by increasing imports, in the current environment of globalization and above all commercially integrated and open spaces, as in the European Union currently in competitive integration process, and not cooperative in the adjustment of expansionary policies and in the balance of trade. This, with no compensated adverse effects, especially in countries with a low percentage of production of tradable goods and insufficient percentage of exports of goods. Insights of promoting consumption are important, but no longer isolated by country, but across the open space and also other exterior spaces with strong sales channels. For which there are, globally, the G5 or G20, and in integrated spaces, its organs of supranational government?

 Therefore, in general, to cut the recessive process, it is required that States respond with expansionary macroeconomic policies (use of savings money, unused in the banking system, expansion of the means of payment and of public spending, tax cuts covering the majority of consumers).

 Not overly indebting spending and mortgaging of the future, especially if budget imbalances were already wrong from before the crisis, when the economic growth should be based mainly on the private sector and not the public. And not in public investments without multiplier effects on the economy and employment. Which may cause a new crisis[1].

 The current economic crisis, visibly started in 2008, which is clearly a major recession that began to afflict in particular  the US and Western Europe, eventually ended up inciding in particular the EU due to powerless monetary policies of austerity and not of expansion and employment support and investment[2].

Inconsiderate policies for the real economy, present and future, cannot be adopted.
With unbalanced measures, in temporal doses seeking budget cuts and the debt at the expense of economy and with socially unfair and unjust solutions to the middle classes, pensioners and workers, blocking the consumption, production and employment.
On the contrary, balanced solutions must be imposed between the need for rebalancing and permanent background restructuring. And not merely circumstantial to solve the "debt crisis"[3], given the excessive debt, but without forgetting the absolute requirement of investments with multiplier effect. With need for rapid and effective policy making.  No income or benefit cuts, without neglecting the essential support issue and increase employment and training. It cannot have in mind only, or mainly, the requirements of the interests of creditors, bankers or not, or of the foreign States in the short term, disregarding the development of a country and the Integrated Economic Space in general in the future. And also not implying these lenders and central institutions and countries of that space in the stagnation of the crisis suffered by countries in relation with them, as a condition for faster payment[4].

III. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

In order to reach a conclusion on the appropriate theory for each period of the economic process and the formulation of the proper framework of economic theories, it is important to analyze the empirical data for striking recessions in the nineteenth century and especially more recent, from the information technologies in USA in 1990, the German recession of the same type in 2000-2005, to the Japanese of 1990-2005 and to the one that drags on from 2007 to 2008, originated from the US financial systems, with consequences that have proved most disastrous in the eurozone.

It will be from this analysis of historically based reality, the data of experience, which should be sought the framework for the evolution of the economic process and then also for the propaedeutic and therapeutics of crisis derived from bursting bubbles and loss of assets. That is, from an all-encompassing analysis of the reality of changing economies, their progress and their setbacks, towards the operation of political societies and the greater or lesser disabilities and / or efficiency of economic law, preventive, sanctioning and curative. Such will provide us support or not, taking a stand, the theorization and the measures that have been in debate.

However, it appears that there are recessions and recessions, some neoclassical conceptions that are acceptable and others are not, invoked correct keynesian solutions and others that are off-season or even falsely invoked. There are not essentially two or more opposing economic theories in insoluble conflict. Despite different assumptions, some of which are wrong, with solutions and measures to be nonsense.

There are, although, times when certain measures are appropriate and others in which the solution are other policy options, but demanding significant State interference, others where it is detrimental to the economic process. In the end, everyone can or not be very correct and very incorrect. And this, regardless of erroneous or correct basic dogmas.

That is, there there reasons not to consider lost or unknown the possible solutions, provided that the timing of the application is the correct one or in appropriate combinations. It is important to locate the notions of theories and experiments from which they come from, adapt and resituated them in terms of appropriate future policies. However, there are times in which concerns have to be on the supply side and of the business world and others where is the demand side and of the deficiencies in the supply market and strong public stimuli that should prevail.

That is, there are no single theories, right or wrong; there is, despite widespread assumptions or wrong dogmas, specific moments for the realization of different theories, for themselves translate abstractions come from analysis of different experiences and logics. Which, if applied in unsuitable moments, although some more than others, can lead to no exceedance of the reasons of the crisis and therefore even to economic and social disasters or its useless extension.

Certain theoretical contributions of neoclassicism to the times of the economic cycle cannot be denied, despite fundamental errors achieved in false dogmas, empirically questionable.

Since a given Schumpeterian approach into the therapeutic of crisis and the subsequent constructiveness a focused analysis solely on the logic of the reassessment of the business community cannot be denied.

Especially, the essential contribution of Keynesianism in phased bubbles, sudden crises, of origin not merely structural of a given economy, before the loss of business assets and panics, stages of a counter cycle in which savings and workers are unused with increased risks loss of national wealth and of the integrated economic space.

Regardless, it is important to not adhere to the Hayekian thought and certain reigning liberalism, including the defense of the social state is important even as a solution for their own advancement of economic progress, as reflected in the experiences of the Nordic economies. You cannot be neither pro nor against neoclassicism or the more confusing theoretical mixed designated Keynesianism.

The most important today is to find the appropriate revenues for the different problems of the economic cycle and the society in which it develops, made of material elements, money, business, risks and profits, but also, enhancing or distorting psychological elements, which can lead to failure even the best economic program or the best theses and may lead other theoretically not so good to success.

This calls for the correction and proper appraisal of the diagnosis, the monitorization of the cycle developments and crisis as well as specifics therapeutics for the different diagnosed problems.

What essentially is meant is that a general theory of macroeconomics requires accuracy in the analysis phase of economic growth cycle to which it relates and the phase of the crisis, its type and dimension, i.e. the "countercyclical".

In the normal phase of the cycle, is defensible its application, better or worse, from certain political and procedural aspects of meanstream economic theories.  Although not strictly with the operation of the invisible hand of Smith or a mere State more or less minimal before regulatory and demanding regulations of the integrated Spaces and even of globalization (Stiglitz, 2004:57–71 and 2006; VVAA, 2002; Williamson, 2008; Anand and Segal, 2008: 57–94; Crafts, 2004: 45–58; Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose, 2003; Hitchner, 2008; Say, 1826; O’Rourke and Williamson, 2001; Galbraith, 1961, 1991), against excesses, "moral hazards" of the banking and financial system, "putative" bankers (shadow-banks).

While in the crisis phase we have a clear observation or structural problems, requiring varied micro reforms, or a sudden shift in company accounts. With abrupt deficits, leading to psycho-materials disastrous trends for the economy in general. Despite understandable at the individual level, but disastrous in its behavior as a whole and momentary on the mere payment of debts. With a unique immediate effort of widespread anticipation of the adjustment of public business or public budget accounts. Placing them in positive or balanced, and simultaneous abandonment of the demand for money (savings that will be reinforced), that stops circulating, remaining useless in deposits, abandoning the business logic of profit maximization.
That is, afraid of the installed economic environment, given the bursting of bubbles and the collapse of asset prices, assuming the world of private agents where the motto is to clean the negative side of the balance sheet and endure the crisis to turn to regain confidence in the economy.

In the normal phase of a healthy economy, in terms of corporate finance assets provide the demand for money and investments, allowing to create quiet liabilities, while in crisis, abruptly emerged, assets degrade generating liabilities.
The guiding principle of businesses is the demand for maximum profit, of loans that permit it and investment. Leading the economy to an increased production, income and aggregate demand.

While in the crisis phase, everything is reversed quickly, due to panic, uncertainty and lack of confidence in the economy, with the abandonment of the profit logic and the deification of the logic of quick payment of debts regenerating all, cleaning of toxic products or generally undervalued, reform of negative balances, elimination or reduction in demand for money, escape the new normal investments, with paradoxical increase of savings of families and with businesses living in cash flow.
Therefore, in recession or even depression, if the crisis is not controlled. And with the export of the crisis if it is not resolved with appropriate internal revenue.
While in the normal cycle, there are positive results for the economy, for the "few" or the most depending on the fiscal and social policies, in the crisis there is a loss of national wealth and damage to almost everyone.

The illusion of monetary policy, so expensive to non-Keynesian is the respective authorities’ temptation. Effective in the normal period, tends (without results for the crisis) to provide liquidity that turns into mere trap in the phase of crisis by recession due to declining demand of money and goods.

Prices can go into possible inflation in the normal phase, but tend to deflate in crisis as interest rates, from normal, become very low.

In the normal phase, banking crises are solved with high spreads and quick removals of loans without return, but in the recession phase, with the usual lack of private demand of money, payment of debts and decrease in aggregate demand, what is necessary is the injection of capital in the economy, support employment and consumption, with the careful removal of the loans of no return.

In normal stages of economic development, budget policy, with investments aimed at economic growth can be counterproductive in that it overlaps the private investment (removing space or rendering more expensive the dynamic private investor), although there is nothing to oppose in general if controlled and already in service of the current social policy.

But it is the only policy capable of controlling the rising crisis or not to let it accentuate and prolong, and in general terms help overcome fragilities of markets  which at the time don’t take advantage of production factors, when going through the substitute intervention of the State, according to the Keynesian theory.

The economic theory cannot be established assuming the unreal existence of a "single-phase model", developmental or with perennial growth, without errors or interposed crises.
And the economic cycle, to which it points to, has to be seen, analyzed and framed, in a articulately and effectively set either for normal profit maximization when there is no crisis, as well as for the abnormality of the necessary minimization  of widespread damage in the economic Space in question, and its export and quick repair when they arise.
In other words, a correct economic theory can only be conceived as a whole tend to be biphasic (“parabiphasic”).

It must have both normal instruments for profit maximization, when the environment permits, as well as diagnostic and therapeutic tools for the period of losses minimization, of debts and of the waste of economic factors (such as money overly spared or the wastage of labor and employment, when the economy requires).
A dual exercise unit must be designed, of distinct phases but articulated coherently.
In fact, in two phases or major periods and subsequent intermediate stages (transit, by adaptation or inertial): the normal business phase, strong, healthy and the crisis phase, weak or sick.

In the normal period, economic agents act as generally the “not Keynesian” approaches: the classical-neoclassical theory, the synthesis of Samuelson, the approach of Schumpeter (1951), the monetarism (Friedman, and Schwartz, 1962, 1963), in general, better or worse, predict.

Companies invest, looking to maximize profits, using the savings that the economy will usually generate, delivered to the banking system or insurer.

The normal trend should be for the maintenance or search of a given budget balance or deficit "controlled" or its adjustment with the dynamization of the economy to provide more financial public means and with the countries with trade deficits financial solving any micro-problems to boost exports and corrections in the balance of payments and open economic Spaces promoting investments and imports from the least developed countries, to avoid significant excesses in bilateral balances, expropriating of the wealth of those Spaces.

The standard of economic policy is to give the most possible space to private sectors, without prejudice of the strengthening of the social State, which is always a function of society and the of the state, being the political economy a social economy, in a politically organized society, where incidentally the social sectors that are most in need or are no longer active should be considered as facilitators of the own overall social system, namely the economic.

Public investment in more developed states with a dynamic private sector to support that adjustment without compromising austerities or wealth losses of the integrated whole, in any case, is not desirable beyond what is justified on the basis of normal government revenue. And not in substitution or abnormal charging of costs in the private sector. Only for support infrastructures of economic development and an attack on regional disparities, beyond rational maintenance of the Social State in its conjunctural level, health, education, culture and social security.
And in this case, not to bear burdens without benefits to society, but with useful occupancy demand for society by the beneficiaries of public funds. With the unemployed to protect, but also to take in benefit of the society that is paying them.
The basic rule in this stage, where entrepreneurs want to use, monetize, the savings generated by the economic system, public investment has no point, catalyst for a healthy economy, especially if such implies overheating of the economy or rising interest rates for the private sectors.

But, given the challenges of open markets and continuing competition (Marchipont, Ramadier, and Vigier, 1992) linked to globalization or the imperfect economic integrations, which lead to asymmetric redistribution of national wealth produced by the whole or in mini crises, nothing prevents certain investments with a multiplying effect, as long as it is not an illegitimate Keynesianism façade of substitution of the economic agents, with hazardous aggravations of the public accounts, which should always be in notice for the periods of necessary and massive intervention in the cyclical crises.

Therefore, without public indebtedness excesses, without severe budget imbalances and only oriented towards maximizing the economic growth (Condesso, F. and Ricardo Alexandre Azevedo, 2014: 1-36; Condesso, 2012) or dynamic sectors in crisis, not by competitive logics based on natural and beneficial comparative advantages, but of losses of it by artificial and varied dumping, tax, customs, labor, environmental, and so on. Or to achieve more relative development and for investments of great interest for the development of a certain economic and social State, highly reproductive and stimulating (investment for the development or support of the economy but not substitute investments initiated by the private sector, aiming to prevent or overcome crises, giving use to savings abnormally wasted by normal market logic).
But so that such acts never to harm but to enhance the private sector activity.

As regards the period of a crisis characterized by degradation of assets, that is, against a crisis due scheme abrupt loss of wealth of a given economic space, there originating or through other exported, regardless of the overall health of the production system, companies and the balance of payments or public debt, we have two fundamental periods in the course of the crisis: the necessary compensatory budget policy of not private investment and restart - sometimes delayed  - of private investments, savings and use of the upturn in demand.

It begins with the bursting of the bubble of the values of overvalued or toxic assets, from an intervention by the monetary authority or ultra-excessive weight of the bubble, to sudden fall in the value of assets, bonds, houses, etc., by pressing the companies with debts, with bankruptcy and unemployment.

Here, companies abandon the logic of profit maximization, to advance a considerable extent for the entrepreneurially correct logic, but abnormal for the economy as a whole from the minimization of debt, with advance payments, creating a recessionary environment, without looking for funds regardless of the price of money, since low or not, then no one wants it, reducing aggregate demand, until cleaning the negative rubrics of their balance sheets, with families not to consume and to increase the savings that are corporately inactive and therefore unproductive in banks or at home.
Only after the repair of company accounting, despite this relief, there is no longer an inhibitory memory over the trauma of sudden and "unexpected" crisis before experienced.
Which acting collectively in each as business "spirit animal", blocks the search for profit, with the contraction of new loans and with families continuing to accumulate savings without confidence in the future.

And if, at this stage, when resumes the search for funding by the private sector of the economy, recovered in its finances and its imminent panics as well as lived, monetary policy is useful, and the financial aid should be reduced in proportion (not to overlap or hinder private investment) until terminated or it is realigned with the practices previous to the crisis, since not distorting of the economy and compromising the normal public accounts).
It is an ever-heavy budget deficit, but usefully, contrary to similar public financial burden that will be without such correct policy and that will have been useless.
Transitional reforms of public finances may be required.

But, given that, without state intervention in the private replacement investments in the crisis phase, it also would grow by bad and useless reasons.

And the new strength of the economy, the normal tracks and essentially in the hands of private enterprise, increases the mass of revenue, until the suffering of this crisis forget the mistakes and that there bubbles and the men that follow again start again greedily to create conditions for the next bubble and eventually the monetary authorities to help - unsuccessfully - to overcome a crisis and theories of the deregulated market and the automatic self-regulation, self-correction of the market (Medialdea Garcia, 2011; Majone, 1996: 54) and not progressive taxation of the richest and the transmission of large inheritances, begin to cause the next economic, financial and social crisis.

The duration of crises depend on the accuracy, completeness and persistence of budget policy by the State or by the competent authorities of the federal or integrated spaces and numbing escape of the monetary policies of austerity or recessive.

The duration and strength of the periods of growth depends not only on confidence and dynamism of the private sector and dimension, more or less, of State intervention.
In the period of crisis, recessions, depressions, may pervade diversified circumstances.

We can have crises by structural deficiencies in the economy.

Here, demanding especially business solutions or political power (concrete solutions operating at the micro level). These crises originating from shortcomings in the production system, structural origin, linked to problems on the supply side, leading to decreased domestic demand, increased imports and loss of ability in terms of exports (in general, competitiveness losses related to loss product quality or lack of its production or production dumping on the outside open trade).

They require essentially micro reforms or correction of inter-spatial standards or of global trade (without the easy path of austerity, merely cyclical rather than structural view, touching in rights on property, income, seniors pensions and social benefits; in fact, in overall, already banned by modern constitutions and that governments in “State of Law” must respect).

Or, therefore, adjustments with intergovernmental rearrangements to return to a fair and useful commerce for all, based on the idea of real comparative competitive advantages (which prevent dumpings of any kind, whether tax, labor, environmental, and can often be indicted by the benchmarks of reality from realistic analysis with this inexplicable logic, immediately above compared to territorial disadvantages within the transport costs or access to raw materials).

But there are also the destabilizing crises of the economy, linked to problems on the demand side, after sudden loss of value of assets of businesses and imbalances of corporate balance sheets, provoking recessions, by bursting bubbles prices of those assets.
In question, are and will continue to be irrecoverable macroeconomic problems with mere restructuring measures of sectors or of monetary nature that elude the problems and create conditions for new similar problems in the future. On the contrary. Crises that are insurmountable or draggable with great future sacrifices and commitments without strong, determined and persistent action of public authorities, by budgetary procedures.
In terms that use the growing money that is stopped from the accumulation of savings not mobilized towards the economy by privates in panic and in joint phase of minimization of debt.

In order to also keep the crisis intra-border and not to allow it to export to other national economies, that would have worsening repercussions and then problems on those which were unable to the be sustained initially.

It is important to add something on the subject of recessions by collapse of asset values resulting from the confidence of the private sector excesses on future economic prospects. Recently, in 1990, overconfidence in the revolution in information technology, whose healing measures led in America to temporize facilitating credit to cause unlimited confidence in the endless housing market. And the same happened in the German recession of 2000-2005, which in itself and monetary measures of euro devaluation dragged to the European Central Bank for trying to help also caused the situation of bubbles created from there in southern European countries.

The collapses, if not directly result from acts of a monetary nature of the public authorities, given the finding of the bubble (to try to cool the economy and avoid an inflationary climb) will be due to the size of the bubbles themselves (which at a certain level burst by themselves).

This sharp decline in asset values has on the private sector the uncontrolled of corporate balance sheets accounts and of businesses.

Making all of them at the same time start early amortization of debt and not wanting to access funds, away from the logic of loans, investments, profit increased demand.
But just in this situation, there are no low interests that can motivate the paying of corporate debt to seek new loans.

Not during the cleaning period of corporate liabilities in time of crisis, or after for as long as the trauma remains.

For that monetary policy is relatively ineffective. It only must return to the scene when the business world reveal signs of being psychologically prepared to return to contract loans.
Only budget policy can avoid the stress of the crisis, recessions or even depressions. And even with national wealth loss recorded with the collapse, it alone can keep the gross national product and living standards of the people.

In this type of crisis, the state action, with investments, bank loans, increased government spending, greater investment in strengthening the social state expenses, must be substantial (suitable for more, the amount of savings not used by the private sector, and persistent, for the duration of the cleaning of the debts, liabilities, enterprises continue even after some time, measured by the inertia to contracting loans against the anti-loans trauma, with aversion to debt.

And it may be accompanied by micro measures. According to the circumstances of the state of each economy, particularly where the crisis coincides with negative national trade balances. Imposing changes from the supply side to boost demand by other external economies, in terms of product quality, dynamic sectors, of tradable goods, incentives for attracting investors. And also increase of affordable wages to boost their own domestic demand and that of other countries in crisis.

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[1] After the collapse of the companies "dot com", a major expansion of the US credit led to the mortgage bubble and subprime crisis, with the expansion of public spending , creating everything , then , largely , the banking crisis and sovereign debt with greater global impact in the case of the euro area.

[2] Only the massive US and European intervention ( this already late and without avoiding excessive austerity in countries in crisis ) , has avoided the worst economies ; but not only the stagnation or decline of wages and social benefits , as well as no real adjustment of trade balances without increasing imports from countries with surpluses of Europe , eg Germany , and Asia , as well as the policies imposed in rescue situations by the IMF and EU , face ( not to support the development of the economy , especially the corporate credit and re-industrialization of high value added ) , but for the payment of debts the banking system and the already surplus countries , does not allow expect anything good in the future (vide, v.g., CHENERY, AHULUWALIA, BELL, DULOY and JOLLY, 1974).

[3] In general, CONDESSO, F. –Derecho de acceso de los ciudadanos a la documentación e información. Cuestiones y fundamentos politológicos, económico-financieros, comunicacionales y ambientales. Tomo I, EUA, RU, Tubingen: Lambert Academic Publishing GMBH & CO. KG, 2012; -Derecho a la información: Crisis del sistema político. Transparencia de los poderes públicos. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011; -Europa em Crise: renegociação da dívida. Solução federal. Lisboa: Caleidoscópio, 2012.

[4] On the critical position against the ultra-liberalism and austerity policies, CONDESSO, Fernando -“Portugal, o Governo Português, o FMI, o BCE e a UE: abordagem politológica da anatomia e anomia do desenrolar da crise. In Troika Ano II. Eduardo Paz Ferreira (Coord.). (Apresentação pública na Reitoria da Universidade de Lisboa, em 20 de maio de 2013). Lisboa: Faculdade de Direito de Lisboa, 2013; -“A península ibérica e a União europeia: Nem esta integração nem o isolacionismo. Da União Europeia disfuncional a um modelo de unificação federal Democrática”. N.º7, REIB, CEIB-URJC, Madrid, Dez2012; -“Administración pública y Desarrollo Económico-Social. Ordenación del Territorio Y Medio Ambiente: Las asimetrías de desarrollo en Portugal y la reforma de las estructuras de gobernación territorial”. Revista Monfragüe del Medio Ambiente, n.º3, 2013; -Portugal em Crise: Pela Reforma Global do Sistema Político e das Políticas Públicas. Proposta de Reformas Institucionais em Momento de Debate Anti-Crise situadas no âmbito das concepções do Estado Constitucional Democrático Social de Direito. Prefácio de Eurico Figueiredo. Lisboa: Ed. Livros do Brasil, 2011; -Desarrollo y Cohesión en la Península Ibérica: El Problema de la Ordenación Territorial. Barcelona: Erasmus Ediciones, Jan 2010; CONDESSO, Ricardo e Fernando -Public administration and social economic development, planning and environment management: asymmetries development in Portugal and the reform of territorial governance structures. Revista Monfragüe. Espanha, n.º3, 2013.